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After a long process of consultation, the South African (SA) 
Parliament enacted the Protection of Personal Information Act 
No. 4 of 2013[1] (POPIA) in 2013. However, the SA government 
placed the commencement of the substantive provisions of POPIA 
temporarily on hold, hence providing a hiatus for society to prepare 
to comply with it. From the commencement date of the entire Act, 
society will enjoy a further year’s grace period to comply, which may 
also be extended. The only sections of POPIA that have commenced 
are the sections dealing with the appointment of the Information 
Regula tor – the monitoring and enforcement mechanism of POPIA.
One of the sections of POPIA that is yet to commence is 
section 13(1), which deals with the conditions for collecting 
personal information. Given that personal information includes a 
person’s biometric information, which in turn includes genomic 
information, this section is relevant to genomic research. It provides 
that personal information must be collected for a ‘specific, explicitly 
defined and lawful purpose’. This requirement signals a departure 
from the status quo in SA of allowing genomic research participants 
to consent not only to current research, but also to future research 
using their genomic information – even though the precise nature 
of such future research may not be clear at present.[2] Despite 
the unambiguous formulation of section 13(1), Staunton et al.[3] 
recently argued that a ‘purposive’ interpretation of POPIA would 
not require a departure from the status quo. In this response article, 
we offer an alternative interpretation of POPIA with relation to 
genomic research, and critically engage with the argument by 
Staunton et al.
Purposive interpretation of  
section 13(1)
It is trite law that statutory provisions should be interpreted 
purposively. This means, quite simply, that the interpreter must 
ascertain the purpose that the provision is intended to serve, 
and then interpret the provision in the light of such purpose. To 
ascertain the purpose of a provision, one must consider the words 
used to articulate the provision, and more broadly the context of 
the statute as a whole.[4] In the latter context, an interpreter should 
look at the preamble of the statute or at other express indications 
in the statute as to the object that has to be achieved; look at what 
led to the enactment (in other words, what was the mischief that 
the statute was intended to deal with); and draw logical inferences 
from the context of the enactment. [5] While the purposive approach 
to interpretation is not legalistic (in the sense of being bound to the 
strict letter rather than the spirit of the law), it is also not divorced 
from the ordinary meaning of words. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal stressed the importance of the words used,[6] and held that 
the ‘inevitable point of departure is the language of the provision 
itself ’. [7] Similarly, the Constitutional Court held that a ‘purposive 
reading of a statute must of course remain faithful to the actual 
wording of the statute’.[8]
In light of the above, consider section 13(1) of POPIA, which 
deals with the first step to conducting genomic research – namely 
DNA sample collection. It reads: ‘Personal information must be 
collected for a specific, explicitly defined and lawful purpose related 
to a function or activity of the responsible party.’ In the context of 
genomic research, the purpose of collecting a DNA sample (which 
contains personal information) can be defined in various ways. 
Typical examples are: (i) blanket consent (no study is defined, 
with no restrictions on the kind of research); (ii) broad consent (a 
broad range of studies is defined, which may be subject to specified 
restrictions); and (iii) specific consent (a specific study is defined). 
Section 13(1) of POPIA clearly chooses one of these typical forms of 
consent, namely specific consent, to the logical exclusion of blanket 
and broad consent. This is, in the words of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, the ‘inevitable point of departure’. Can the context of the 
statute as a whole cast any further light on how a ‘specific, explicitly 
defined … purpose’ should be understood?
With reference to POPIA’s preamble and section 2, which sets out 
the purpose of the statute, POPIA’s objective, in brief, is to define how 
personal information – including a person’s genomic information – 
may be collected, retained, disseminated and used. The statute 
strives to strike a balance between persons’ privacy rights  in their 
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personal information, and other rights and interests, such as 
the free flow of information without unnecessary impediments. 
Accordingly, in the context of genomic research, POPIA strives to 
strike a balance between a research participant’s privacy right in his 
or her genomic information, and, inter alia, a genomic researcher’s 
right to access information and freedom of scientific research. It 
is in this context that POPIA provides that a genomic researcher 
can in principle access and do research on a research participant’s 
genomic information, but on condition that, inter alia, the research 
participant consents to his or her genomic information being 
collected for a specific, explicitly defined purpose. There is nothing 
in the context of POPIA as a whole that suggests that section 13(1) 
can refer to anything but a specific research study.
Analysing Staunton et al.’s argument
Staunton et al.’s main line of argument is that requiring specific 
consent ‘would raise difficulties for many genetic research studies’ 
and ‘stifle current and future research and innovation’, because 
‘all research participants for current and ongoing research for 
which broad consent was used would have to be re-contacted and 
re-consented’; given that genomic research is in the public interest, 
requiring a ‘specific consent model for all research studies would 
undermine the public interest’; as such, the public interest demands 
that POPIA must be purposively interpreted to ‘permit broad consent 
for the processing of personal information for research’.
Will specific consent stifle genomic research?
Clearly, re-contacting and re-consenting countless numbers of 
research participants would pose a significant obstacle. However, 
if one considers the actual past practices of SA biobanks, and the 
‘further processing’ provisions of POPIA, we suggest that this 
scenario sketched by Staunton et al. is not necessarily – or even 
likely to be – the outcome of the specific consent requirement in 
section 13(1).
Allow us to explain: section 15 of POPIA makes provision for 
further processing (which would include further research) of 
information that has already been collected – without the need 
to obtain new consent again. But there are important conditions. 
One such condition is contained in section 15(1) of POPIA, 
which reads that ‘Further processing of personal information 
must be in accordance or compatible with the purpose for which 
it was collected in terms of section 13.’ As such, further processing 
is inextricably linked to compliance with the requirement in 
section 13 that personal information must be collected for a specific 
purpose. In other words, if the original consent was not for a specific 
purpose, there can be no further processing. Because of the past 
focus on broad consent to build biobanks, this requirement may 
at first glance seem unlikely to be complied with by SA biobanks. 
However, this is not necessarily the case: a common model used in 
SA to build biobanks for genomic research is to recruit research 
participants for a specific research study, and then simultaneously 
request broad consent for the storage of the samples after the study 
for an indefinite period, and to the use of the genomic information 
contained in such samples for the purpose of future research 
studies. Although the broad consent does not assist in the POPIA 
context, the original specific consent does. This is a crucial aspect of 
assessing POPIA’s impact on genomic research. However, Staunton 
et al. failed to consider this aspect.
In effect, POPIA establishes a regime in which the initial 
specific consent at the time of collection functions as a blanket 
consent to future research studies. Stated differently, if specific 
consent is in place (in terms of section 13(1)), a research group 
can rely on POPIA’s ‘further processing’ provisions (section 15) to 
conduct any bona fide research. Biobanks that were built on the 
simultaneous specific and broad consent model will therefore be 
able to continue with their activities; in contrast, biobanks that 
were built independently of specific research studies, and where 
only broad consent was obtained, will have to obtain new, specific 
consent from research participants. Once specific consent has been 
obtained, the endless horizon of unlimited future research projects 
beckons – at least in the POPIA context. Note that other legal 
and ethical instruments may have their own requirements, such 
as obtaining broad consent from research participants for further 
research. These requirements are not affected by POPIA, but 
continue to operate as independent layers within the legal-ethical 
regulatory system, and may constitute pertinent limitations on the 
effective blanket consent regime of POPIA.
We now return to the argument by Staunton et al. based on the 
premise that requiring specific consent ‘would raise difficulties for 
many genetic research studies’ and stifle research. Clearly, given 
our explanation above, this premise is all but self-evident. In the 
absence of solid empirical data that a substantial number of SA 
genomic research biobanks were indeed built using broad consent 
alone, with no original specific consent at collection, this premise 
cannot be accepted. It follows that the first argument by Staunton 
et al. fails to convince.
Public interest is multifaceted
Even if, for the sake of argument, one accepts Staunton et al.’s 
premise that requiring specific consent would stifle research, their 
first argument still fails to convince. Core to the argument is the 
reliance on the idea of public interest. We agree with Staunton 
et al. that genomic research is in the public interest. But so is the 
protection of research participants’ privacy rights in their genomic 
information. Clearly, public interest is a double-edged sword in 
this context. POPIA represents a delicate balancing exercise by the 
legislature. In fact, the issue of research that is in the public interest 
has been specifically incorporated into POPIA: where research is 
in the public interest, the need for consent to such research may 
be obviated provided that certain protections are in place (section 
27(1)(d)). Note, however, that this public interest exemption from 
consent for research (as a form of processing information) does 
not affect the requirement contained in section 13(1) of POPIA 
that there must be specific consent for the collection of personal 
information. Collection, of course, is the essential step before the 
processing of such information can take place. Our point here is 
that the legislature already considered the importance of research 
that is in the public interest and created a special exemption for 
it within the POPIA framework. Importantly, however, is that this 
special exemption for research that is in the public interest is within 
circumscribed bounds. There is no indication that the purpose of 
POPIA is to privilege public interest research above privacy rights 
to such an extent as to eliminate any aspect that may cause the 
researchers involved extra effort. The reliance on public interest by 
Staunton et al. therefore does not assist in advancing their purposive 
interpretation argument.
POPIA and other policy instruments
Staunton et al. point out that POPIA ‘does not exist in isolation, but 
is one of a number of pre-existing frameworks that govern genomic 
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research’; and these other legal instruments and guidelines only 
require broad consent, and not specific consent. However, the fact 
that these ‘pre-existing frameworks’ require a lower benchmark 
(broad consent) for collecting genomic information from research 
participants than the new legislation (POPIA) in no way compromises 
the new legislation’s higher benchmark (specific consent) for 
collecting genomic information from research participants. In fact, 
it can be argued that the distinctly higher benchmark introduced by 
the new privacy-specific legislation can be perceived as a deliberative 
legislative reaction to the insufficient privacy protection afforded by 
the non-privacy-specific ‘pre-existing frameworks’. In other words, 
the lower benchmark of broad consent can well be the mischief that 
POPIA was intended to deal with. As such, a purposive approach to 
interpreting POPIA in the light of ‘pre-existing frameworks’ would 
underscore the importance of the new specific consent requirement 
in section 13(1).
Conclusions
We have shown that when section 13(1) of POPIA is interpreted 
according to the tenets of purposive interpretation, its meaning is 
as clear as the words chosen by the legislature: ‘specific, explicitly 
defined … purpose’ means just what it says. And, although section 
13(1) deals with the collection of personal information, the next 
step, namely the processing of personal information, which includes 
research that is conducted on the genomic information of research 
participants, will only be legal if the initial collection was in compliance 
with section 13(1). As we have shown, once specific consent has been 
obtained, POPIA effectively deals with the specific consent as a 
blanket consent for research, subject to certain conditions and privacy 
safeguards. However, the notion that POPIA can be purposively 
interpreted to require broad consent at any stage of a research project 
has no merit. Going forward, genomic researchers in SA would be 
well advised to take measures to ensure compliance with POPIA’s new 
dispensation of specific consent.
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